The macroeconomic policy content of the PRSPs: how much pro-

growth, how much pro-poor? by Gottschalk, Ricardo
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Macroeconomic Policy Content of the PRSPs: How Much Pro-
Growth, How Much Pro-Poor?1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ricardo Gottschalk 
The Institute of Development Studies 
University of Sussex 
Brighton BN1 9RE, UK 
Tel: +44 (0) 1273 606261 
Fax: +44 (0) 1273 621202/691647 
Email: R.Gottschalk@ids.ac.uk 
 
 
February 2004 
 
                                                          
1 This paper was prepared for The North-South Institute. I would like to thank Rodney 
Schmidt, Tom Crowards and CIDA for helpful comments and suggestions on an 
earlier draft. Discussions with, as well ideas and inputs from Xavier Cirera were 
critical for the development of this paper. The usual caveats apply. 
 2
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the past 25 years or so, the Bretton Woods institutions have encouraged developing 
countries to undertake economic and liberalisation reforms. The intended outcome 
was greater economic stability, growth and ultimately poverty alleviation. There is a 
growing consensus today that, although some countries have made progress in 
attaining growth and poverty reduction, in many cases the results have been 
disappointing. Many developing countries have experienced relatively poor growth 
performance, and, in some cases, the living conditions of the poor have worsened 
rather than improved.  
 
The reforms have included trade and capital account liberalisation. A number of 
countries that have liberalised their capital accounts succeeded in attracting 
international private capital flows – the so called emerging market economies. 
However, these flows have shown to be highly volatile, and as a result, this group of 
countries suffered from a high degree of financial volatility, in many cases resulting in 
financial crises that were developmentally very costly (see, for example, Griffith-
Jones and Ocampo, 2000). Unlike the emerging market economies, the poorer 
countries were unable to attract large amounts of private capital flows, remaining 
dependent on official flows to finance their balance of payments needs. However, 
these countries also suffered from high volatility, caused by a variety of exogenous 
shocks, such as terms of trade shocks and natural disasters. The intended benefits 
associated with the liberalisation reforms thus failed to materialise, causing sharp 
disillusionment, especially among the poorer countries. 
 
In face of that, the international thinking seems to be slowly converging towards the 
recognition that alternative policies are needed, to appropriately deal with the 
macroeconomic volatility developing countries are subject to in a fairly liberalised, 
global economy (ECLAC, 2002;  Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003; Cagatay et al., 
2000). In this new context, a number of alternative macroeconomic policies have been 
proposed for adoption in developing countries. These are mainly countercyclical 
policies, aimed at addressing macroeconomic volatility and their negative effects on 
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growth, employment and the living conditions, particularly of the poor. Even the 
larger European economies, which are suffering from lack of flexibility due to 
policies they have to follow under the Stability and Growth Pact, are searching for 
more room for counter-cyclical actions to deal with their persistently weak 
macroeconomic conditions.  
   
At the same time, under the HIPC context, the poorer countries have been encouraged 
to adopt poverty reduction strategies, and in this regard to prepare poverty reduction 
strategy papers (PRSPs), as a condition for debt relief. The PRSPs have meant putting 
together a development strategy that should contribute to poverty alleviation and 
thereby to the achievement of the millennium development goals set by the 
international community. To this end, they have proposed the adoption of a wide 
range of economic policies (macro, sectoral, structural) and institutional reforms; and 
have included innovative elements, such as the engagement of the civil society 
through the participatory process, the focus on governance issues, and alternative 
social policies. 
 
Disappointingly, despite a growing interest in alternative macroeconomic policies 
both in developed and middle-income countries, and a commitment by the PRSP 
process to innovate, what it seems is that the macroeconomic policies the PRSPs have 
been formulating have essentially been a continuation of those policies adopted by the 
majority of the PRSP countries under the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
during the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to shed some more light on this important issue, by 
analysing the macroeconomic content of the PRSPs. The objectives are, first, to assess 
the PRSPs’ macroeconomic policies from a growth and poverty reduction perspective. 
And second, to see whether the PRSPs have introduced alternative policies into their 
proposed macroeconomic policy frameworks, thus following trends elsewhere, or 
whether innovative elements permeating the PRSPs have been limited mainly to the 
participatory process, governance issues and social policies. By doing so, this paper 
fills an important research gap, as most work on PRSPs to date has focused on the 
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participatory process,2 with much less effort being devoted to analysing the substance 
of the PRSPs, particularly their core macroeconomic policies. The existing analysis of 
the content of PRSPs has focused on budgetary issues, e.g. how resources can be re-
directed/increased towards the social sectors and benefit the poor more effectively, or 
on structural reforms.3  
 
This paper will thus analyse the macroeconomic content of the PRSPs of 15 
countries.4  The analysis will be carried out on a comparative basis, whereby we aim 
to identify those macroeconomic policies that have been commonly proposed by the 
PRSPs, as well as those policies that are country specific. Where it has clearly been 
the case, it will indicate what policies seem in reality to be in conflict, rather than in 
accordance, with the PRSP's broad aims. The paper will also identify the main growth 
targets specified in the PRSPs, and, where these targets look too ambitious (for 
example, when measured against past performance), it will examine whether specific 
macroeconomic policies have been designed for the purpose of making these targets 
feasible. Furthermore, it will try to find out whether (and if so, to what extent) 
innovative policy/mechanisms have been proposed, especially for dealing with 
macroeconomic volatility and exogenous shocks. Finally, the paper will discuss the 
PRSPs’ proposed financial reforms. The reason for discussing the financial reforms, 
but not others, is that we believe these reforms may have important implications for 
growth and poverty reduction, some of which clearly negative, which have not 
received enough attention from the PRSP debate. 
 
The paper is organised in 6 sections. Section 2 provides an overview of the PRSP 
countries’ common structural features, as well as the common features shared by their 
PRSPs. Section 3 analyses the macroeconomic content of the PRSPs, in four sub-
sections under the headings: 1) the growth targets; 2) the monetary framework; 3) the 
fiscal framework; and 4) the exchange rate policy. Section 4 will discuss the financial 
                                                          
2 See, for example, Booth (2001), who analyses the PRSP processes in 8 African countries, and Jenkins 
and Tsoka (2001), who discusses the PRSP experience in Malawi, both with a focus on participation 
and institutionalisation issues. 
3 Bevan and Adam (2001) may be among the few exceptions on work focusing on PRSP’s 
macroeconomic policies. 
4 The countries are: Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Honduras, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia. 
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reform. Section 5 provides a set of policy recommendations for adoption by the 
PRSPs, to support growth and poverty reduction. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. PRSPs: Background Information and an Overview of their Common Elements 
 
This section has two sub-sections. The first sub-section provides an overview of the 
PRSP countries’ structural features. The second sub-section summarises the main 
common features of the poverty reduction strategies proposed by the PRSPs. 
 
2.1. The Countries' Common Structural Features 
 
Table 1 displays information on the incidence of poverty in the 15 countries under 
analysis. The indicator used is the population living below the poverty line; the 
figures are taken from the PRSPs. They are based on national surveys that use 
different definitions of poverty and methodologies for measuring it. The indicator 
therefore should not be used for comparative purposes. Yet, it serves well the purpose 
of showing us that in all countries the poor are quite numerous, corresponding to at 
least almost half of their total populations. In order to also provide information on 
poverty from sources outside the PRSPs, column 3 of Table 1 displays an indicator of 
population living below $1 a day, taken from the Human Development Report 20003. 
 
Table 1. Incidence of Poverty 
 
Population living below the poverty line  
Year % 
Population living 
below $1 a day % 
1990-20011 
Bolivia 1999 63.0 14.4 
Burkina Faso 1998 45.3 61.2 
Ethiopia 1999/2000 44.0 81.9 
Honduras 1999 66.0 23.8 
Malawi 1998 65.3 41.7 
Mauritania 1996 50.0 28.6 
Mozambique 1996/1997 69.4 37.9 
Nicaragua 1998 47.9 82.3 
Niger 1993 63.0 61.4 
Rwanda 2001 60.3 35.7 
Senegal 2001 53.9 26.3 
Tanzania Na Na 19.9 
Uganda 1997 44.0 82.2 
Vietnam 1998 37.4 17.7 
Zambia 1998 72.9 63.7 
Sources: information taken from the countries’ PRSPs, based on national surveys. 
1 Data from the Human Development Report 2003; refers to the most recent year available. 
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The incidence of poverty reflects mainly a very low level of GDP per capita, which is 
the case of almost all countries (see Table 2). Their average GDP per capita was just 
380 US dollars (at constant 1995 prices) in the year 2000. If the Latin American 
countries are excluded, the average falls to less than 300 US dollars. 
 
Table 2. GDP per capita  
                                constant 1995 US$ 
 Year 
2000 
Bolivia 951.6
Burkina Faso 252.1
Ethiopia 115.9
Honduras 711.1
Malawi 168.6
Mauritania 495.7
Mozambique 191.1
Nicaragua 465.6
Niger 202.8
Rwanda 241.8
Senegal 609.2
Tanzania 190.5
Uganda 348.0
Vietnam 355.7
Zambia 392.4
Average  380.0
Average (excludes LA countries) 297.0
Source: World Development Indicators. 
 
High poverty levels and low income per capita are not the only characteristics these 
countries have in common. Many face high inequality in its different forms, e.g. of 
assets, income and rights. Moreover, in these countries inequality has a geographical 
dimension as well, as in most cases poverty is concentrated in rural areas. Other key 
common characteristics among the 15 countries include their relatively large 
agricultural sector and narrow productive base. Partly as a reflection of that, these 
countries' exports are concentrated on very few primary products. Their export base is 
therefore weak, which has made them very vulnerable to terms of trade and other 
external shocks.  A further common characteristic these countries share is their low 
savings rate, large savings-investment gap, large fiscal deficits (before grants) and 
therefore strong dependence on foreign aid. Finally, most of these countries also have 
in common weak and fragile economic, legal and political institutions.  
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2.2. PRSPs: overview of their common features 
 
In recognition that poverty is prevalent and that the resources are limited, all the 
PRSPs under analysis place sustainable economic growth at the forefront of their 
poverty reduction strategies. Accordingly, virtually all Papers have clearly set 
ambitious growth targets. Having established growth as the key factor in contributing 
to overcoming poverty, the PRSPs recognise that although growth is a necessary 
condition for poverty reduction, it is not sufficient. In line with the current 
international thinking in development (World Bank, 2000; DFID, 2000), they argue 
that growth should be broad based to ensure a rapid decline in poverty levels. 
 
Thus, all PRSPs aim to promote rapid and sustainable economic growth, but stress 
that growth has to be pro-poor. The key elements the PRSPs propose to accelerate 
growth are, first, increased investment in human capital, and economic and social 
infrastructure; second, the promotion of a stable macroeconomic environment; and, 
third, structural and institutional reforms. The latter two elements are expected to 
contribute to growth through providing the private sector with the appropriate 
incentives for investment and by enhancing the level of competitiveness in the 
economy. 
 
The Papers expect to achieve a stable macroeconomic environment through the 
adoption of prudent macroeconomic policies, particularly in the monetary and fiscal 
domains. Typically, the envisaged monetary policy is aimed primarily at guaranteeing 
low inflation, and, where inflation has been high, at lowering it towards international 
levels. The advocated policy instrument for achieving these objectives usually is the 
use of monetary targets. In order to make the targets feasible and credible, emphasis is 
put on de-linking monetary expansion from fiscal demands and on promoting central 
bank autonomy. The proposed fiscal policy, in turn, is normally the one based on the 
adoption of balanced government budgets, although in a few cases the stated objective 
is limited to ensuring fiscal sustainability, with allowance for fiscal deficits in the 
short to the medium term.  
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Strengthening the external sector is a further aim of the macroeconomic policies. 
Most PRSPs acknowledge that maintaining competitive exchange rates is a key 
instrument for achieving this objective. The latter is seen as particularly important for 
supporting export growth and diversification, considered as crucial for generating 
foreign exchange and providing a major source of demand for the domestic economy.  
 
The proposed structural policies and reforms include mainly (though not only) labour, 
tax, financial sector and trade reforms. The central objectives of the labour reforms 
are to make the labour markets flexible and to improve the productivity of the labour 
force. The importance attached to the latter is based on the assessment that the 
productivity of labour is very low. This assessment is made especially by the PRSPs 
of those countries that have experienced poor growth performance in the past. The tax 
reform, intended to deliver a more rational tax system, is expected to provide 
incentives to the private sector to produce and invest. Moreover, it is expected to 
provide additional resources for public capital and social expenditures. Financial 
reform, in turn, is aimed at ensuring stability of the financial system, contributing to 
its development and making it an important source of finance for the economy. 
Finally, the trade reform, though not clearly specified, is aimed at boosting the 
external competitiveness of the economy. Importance to the trade reform is attached 
particularly by the PRSPs of those countries that have been slow at adopting structural 
reforms under the World Bank-led structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) or that 
have not adopted these programmes at all. 
 
To ensure that the poor can benefit from the growth process, many PRSPs propose a 
development strategy that prioritises agricultural development. Moreover, a key 
component of all PRSPs is the distribution of fiscal resources. Budgetary allocation, 
the Papers stress, should prioritise spending on poverty reduction programmes and 
basic infrastructure. Further elements aimed at benefiting the poor which can be found 
in some PRSPs (but not all) include asset redistribution and provision of micro-credit.  
These elements - asset redistribution, micro-credit and improved infrastructure  - put 
together are expected to enhance the capacity of the poor to produce and generate 
income, through giving them access to assets, credit and markets. 
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As mentioned earlier, all PRSP countries are very vulnerable to external shocks. This 
is amply acknowledged by all PRSPs. However, very few Papers propose policies that 
can be used to prevent, or at least cope with the immediate economic and social 
consequences of these shocks and the volatility that they generate in the economy.  
 
Finally, a common factor among the PRSPs is the near absence of targeting capital 
account liberalisation as part of the package of liberalisation reforms. In our 
judgement, this is a very positive aspect, which apparently reflects the current 
consensus among the Bretton Woods' institutions and the international financial 
community at large around a cautious approach towards full capital account 
convertibility. The negative aspect of it is that some of the 15 countries have already 
fully liberalised their capital account, but there is hardly any discussion of the possible 
negative implications, or how these could be tackled. 
 
How similar are these policies to the structural adjustment programmes supported by 
the World Bank? SAPs were initially adopted in the 1980s in response to balance of 
payments (BOP) crises facing developing countries. The diagnosis was that BOP 
crises reflected not only poor demand management, but also problems of structural 
nature. Therefore, SAPs’ objectives included not just macroeconomic stability, to be 
achieved through demand management policies, but also long-term supply response, 
to be engendered through a change in relative prices (to the benefit of tradable and 
rural sectors), and the reduction of the State in economic activities (Demery, 1994). 
These intermediate objectives were expected to be achieved through: macroeconomic 
discipline, trade liberalisation, the liberalisation of product and factor markets, 
financial sector reforms, and privatisation of state-owned enterprises. These measures 
were expected to ultimately increase economic efficiency and enhance economic 
growth. 
 
Thus, both the objectives and the set of policies proposed under SAPs and PRSPs 
look very similar. The major difference resides in the emphasis they put on their 
objectives. Under SAPs, the immediate objective was stability. Growth as was an 
objective to be achieved only in the long-term through structural reforms. Poverty 
reduction, although also desired, was not explicitly pursued. In contrast, under the 
PRSPs growth and poverty reduction are direct policy objectives, even though their 
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policies, this paper argues, have not been sufficiently adapted in response to this 
change in emphasis.  
 
Having provided an overview of the main common elements contained in the PRSPs' 
development strategies, in what follows we will discuss in more depth their 
macroeconomic content, focusing on the core macroeconomic policies and targets. 
These are the growth targets, and monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies. The 
purpose is to identify their main characteristics and shortcomings, with a view to 
informing the PRSP process.  
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3. Analysis of the Macroeconomic Content of PRSPs  
 
3.1. The Growth Targets 
 
All PRSPs identify rapid and sustainable growth as key to reduce poverty. 
Accordingly, they all have clearly stipulated growth targets. These were set taking 
into account the countries' growth performance in the 1990s, as the latter can give an 
indication of how much growth they can realistically aim for.  
 
Table 3. GDP growth in the 1990s and the PRSP growth targets 
                     % 
 Average 1990-99 Average 1995-99 2000 Target 
Bolivia 4.0 3.9 2.4 5.0-5.5 
Burkina Faso 4.7 5.9 2.2 7.0-8.0 
Ethiopia 3.7 5.4 5.4 7.0 
Honduras 2.8 2.8 4.8 5.0-6.0 
Malawi 4.2 7.0 1.7 5.0 
Mauritania 3.4 4.2 5.2 8.0 
Mozambique 5.7 8.5 1.6 7.0 
Nicaragua 2.9 5.1 4.3 4.5 
Niger 1.9 3.7 0.1 4.0 
Rwanda 2.1 15.7 5.6 7.0 
Senegal 3.3 5.3 5.6 7.0-8.0 
Tanzania 3.1 3.8 5.1 5.0-6.0 
Uganda 6.9 7.7 3.5 7.0 
Vietnam 7.4 7.5 5.5 8.0 
Zambia 0.3 1.5 3.5 4.0 
Source: World Development Indicators.  
 
As can be seen in Table 3, some countries experienced rapid growth in the 1990s. For 
example, Vietnam, Uganda and Mozambique exhibited an average growth of 7.4%, 
6.9% and 5.7%, respectively. Other countries grew less rapidly over the decade, but 
still growth was moderately high. This was the case of Burkina Faso, Bolivia and 
Malawi, all the three countries experiencing growth rates of or above 4%. In other 
cases, growth picked up in the second half of the 1990s, i.e. Ethiopia, Mauritania, 
Nicaragua, Rwanda, Senegal and Tanzania. Finally, growth was disappointing 
throughout the decade for Honduras, Niger and Zambia.  
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In 2000, the picture changes, with some moderate and strong performers in the 1990s 
experiencing a decline in growth (e.g. Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mozambique 
and Uganda), due to terms of trade shocks and natural disasters. In contrast, Honduras 
witnessed accelerated growth in 2000 after a decade of relatively poor performance.  
 
Because the recent growth patterns in the 15 countries were somewhat dissimilar, the 
proposed targets among countries are different as well, varying between annual 
average growth of 4% and 8% (Table 3). However, as Table 3 shows, for almost all 
countries the growth targets were set above (or well above) the average growth of the 
1990s (or even the second half of the 1990s when growth speeded up for some 
countries). In some cases, the target is close to the picks of the trends observed in the 
1990s, which differ considerably from the average trend due to large variations in 
growth rates over the whole period. The question that then arises is: are these targets 
feasible? 
 
Two factors seem to stand in the countries’ way to meet these targets. The first refers 
to lack of clearly quantifiable additional sources of finance needed to support more 
rapid growth. The second refers to growth volatility and the lack of instruments to 
make it less volatile. 
 
As regards the source of financing, crude calculations show that the investment rates 
required for achieving the growth targets are well above those rates observed in the 
second half of the 1990s or even in 2000 (Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger and 
Rwanda are exceptions to that; see Table 4). However, no clear additional financing 
sources have been identified in quantifiable ways to support the higher investment 
needed for higher growth. Higher investment is expected to come mainly from the 
private sector, as a response of the intended structural reforms. A further channel by 
which private investment is expected to increase thus contributing to partially filling 
the gap between current and required investment is through fiscal tightening. The 
rationale is that the latter would result in lower interest rates and less financial 
crowding-out, therefore releasing resources for the private sector to invest. These are 
not quantified, however. 
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Public investment, in turn, is expected to be higher, as an increase in public capital 
expenditure is predicted. But additional resources needed to support higher public 
investment would have to come from the HIPC initiative or made available through 
an increase in external official assistance (other than HIPC). However, the HIPC 
resources are intended mainly to finance recurrent expenditure, e.g. health, education, 
while an increase in external assistance beyond HIPC, though possible, is not 
guaranteed. An additional envisaged financing source of public investment is 
increased government revenues, as a result of tax reform. Some countries project the 
expected increase in tax revenues, but these are based on very optimistic assumptions 
on growth and on the capacity of specific taxes, e.g. VAT, to provide increased 
revenues.  
 
Table 4. Level of Investment Needed to Meet the Growth Targets  
         
 Growth 
Targets 
Investment/GDP 
(average 1996-2000) 
Investment/GDP
Year 2000 
Investment/GDP 
Required to Meet the 
Growth Targets1 
Bolivia 5.0-5.5 19.1 17.2 23.0-25.4 
Burkina Faso 7.0-8.0 27.6 25.5 42.9-49.0 
Ethiopia 7.0 16.5 15.3 18.4 
Honduras 5.0-6.0 32.4 32.5 41.7-50.0 
Malawi 5.0 12.9 12.5 15.5 
Mauritania 8.0 20.6 30.3 35.4 
Mozambique 7.0 28.6 39.6 17.6 
Nicaragua 4.5 30.81 24.222 25.4 
Niger 4.0 10.6 10.78 8.92 
Rwanda 7.0 15.5 17.53 12.6 
Senegal 7.0-8.0 18.8 19.8 23.9-27.3 
Tanzania 5.0-6.0 15.7 17.6 20.1-24.1 
Uganda 7.0 17.7 19.8 22.3 
Vietnam 8.0 28.5 29.6 35.7 
Zambia 4.0 16.0 18.7 19.5 
Source: World Development Indicators. 
1 Calculated using the countries' average incremental-capital output ratios over the 1996-2000 period, 
with years marked by deep recession  (often caused by exogenous shocks) being taken out. 
2Average 1996-1998. 
3 Refers to the year 1998. 
 
In these countries, the productivity of their factors of production is admittedly low; an 
increase in it could partially compensate for lack of higher investment. This increase 
is expected to take place as a result of the intended structural reforms (tax, trade 
liberalisation, etc.). However, even if executed as planned, these reforms would have 
their effects on the productivity of the factors of production only fully felt in the 
medium to long term. Moreover, these effects may be smaller than expected.  
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Growth volatility may represent a second deterrent to more rapid growth. It is already 
high among this group of countries, and may become more intense as the economies 
become more open. It can affect growth, especially its long-term trend, through 
uncertainty it creates among private investors, both foreign and domestic; and 
secondly, by causing a decline in government revenues, which can in turn reinforce 
the initial decline in growth.  
 
Unfortunately, although the PRSPs stress the need for macroeconomic stability, the 
focus is on price stability and fiscal balance, believed to be the key elements to 
underpin overall macroeconomic stability; as a consequence, both the proposed 
monetary and fiscal frameworks are designed to support these two objectives only 
(see below). These frameworks do not contain any monetary devices or counter-
cyclical fiscal elements, to prop up domestic demand when it declines. They therefore 
lack any meaningful mechanisms that can help smooth out aggregate demand.  
 
Even where counter-cyclical elements exist (see below), a further problem is that 
more often than not the decline in growth may not be related to the downturn phase of 
the business cycle, but, rather, caused by external shocks. These shocks are so 
frequent and the volatility they cause so deep – and even disruptive -, that in the face 
of this, the volatility associated with the business cycles may look as a problem of 
secondary importance. However, the PRSPs lack countervailing mechanisms that can 
be activated when the economy is hit by these shocks. 
 
The majority of the Papers acknowledge that the growth targets may be rather 
ambitious. In response to that, a few of them propose alternative targets, based on less 
optimistic scenarios.5 This was the case of the PRSPs for Niger, whose growth 
performance at the time of the PRSP formulation was rather weak due to 
unfavourable weather conditions; Senegal, which acknowledges the impact of 
external shocks on growth and even provides simulations of this impact on growth 
performance (although it does not elaborate on how to deal with this impact); and 
Uganda, where growth slowed down in 2000 after strong growth performance in the 
                                                          
5 The IMF progress assessments of the PRSPs reach similar conclusions (see IMF PRSP Annual 
Progress Report, various issues). 
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1990s; in fact, in 2001 the target was not met, due to a deterioration in the country's 
terms of trade (coffee and oil prices), drought and EU ban on fish exports. 
 
The reason for setting growth targets so high is that by only growing very fast these 
countries will be able to reduce poverty significantly, as pointed out earlier. 
According to calculations provided by Hanmer et al. (1999), to meet the millennium 
goal of halving extreme poverty by 2015, Sub-Saharan countries would have to grow 
at over 8% per annum.6 This figure is higher than the growth targets set by the eleven 
Sub-Saharan countries of our sample (except for Mauritania; see Table 3). This 
indicates that, although already high, the current growth targets may not be sufficient 
to meet the poverty reduction targets for 2015. This further indicates that lower 
growth targets, although more realistic, may leave poor countries even farther away 
from the millennium development goals, unless, of course, growth is accompanied 
with better income distribution. 
 
In sum, the growth targets set by the PRSPs look quite ambitious (even if still not 
sufficient to meet the poverty reduction goals), first because possible additional 
sources of finance seem improbable to become available in the short term, and are not 
even appropriately quantified. Second, because the volatility of growth, which has 
strongly marked the PRSP countries in the past, if exacerbated may lower these 
countries' growth trends. 
 
In recognition that volatility in growth (and other economic variables) caused by 
terms of trade shocks and natural disasters is a major problem facing poor countries, 
the IMF has put forward a proposal to increase the external financial assistance to 
countries facing external shocks (IMF, 2003). At the national level, however, the 
countries' macroeconomic frameworks include very few mechanisms to deal with 
shocks (see below). 
                                                          
6 It should be noted that the authors reach this figure under the assumption that there will be no 
improvement in income distribution. 
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3.2. The Monetary Framework 
 
Nearly all Papers propose a monetary policy that is focused on price stability. 
Accordingly and to show firm commitment to this policy goal, the Papers set 
quantitative targets for inflation. Table 5 shows that the targets for annual inflation are 
very low, ranging between 3% and 5%. Honduras is the only country outside this 
range, with a target of 9%. At the same time, it is possible to see from Table 5 that 
current inflation is already at, or below, the established targets for many countries.7 In 
these circumstances the objective is to ensure that inflation is kept at the current 
levels, or even to bring it further down to a very low level. 
 
Table 5. Inflation in the 1990s and the PRSP inflation targets 
 % 
 Average 1990-99 Average 1995-99 2000 Target 
Burkina Faso 4.5 4.0 -0.3 3.0 
Bolivia 10.4 7.4 4.6 4.0 
Ethiopia 7.8 3.2 -0.04 5.0 
Honduras 19.7 19.8 10.11 9.0 
Malawi 31.0 40.9 29.5 4.0 
Mauritania 6.4 5.6 3.3 5.0 
Mozambique 34.1 22.1 Na 3.0 
Nicaragua 1053.7 11.2 9.91 4.0 
Niger 4.3 4.2 2.9 3.0 
Rwanda 8.6 5.8 3.9 3.0 
Senegal 4.4 2.8 0.7 3.0 
Tanzania 23.1 17.2 5.9 4.0 
Uganda 15.9 5.8 2.8 5.0 
Vietnam Na 5.1 -1.7 Na 
Zambia Na Na Na Na 
Source: World Development Indicators. 
1 ECLAC. 
 
Furthermore, Table 5 shows that inflation is on a declining trend in those countries 
that have not met their targets yet.8 Malawi and Zambia (figures are not displayed for 
the latter) have been exceptions to that. 
 
Low inflation levels have been an appreciable achievement for all these countries, 
especially the Latin American ones, which have suffered from very high inflation in 
the past. Aiming for price stability is clearly consistent with the objective of poverty 
                                                          
7 The countries  are: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Uganda. 
8 The countries  that fall into this situation  are: Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Rwanda and Tanzania. 
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reduction, as high inflation tends to hurt the poor most, given their lack of access to 
remunerated bank accounts or other protection mechanisms against inflation.9 
However, the design of their monetary policy is narrowly focused on price stability, 
with limited reference to other objectives. A few countries have additional objectives, 
such as the need to support the exchange rate policy and an increase in international 
reserves. But no references are found in the PRSPs to two objectives that are very 
important, from the poverty reduction perspective: growth and employment. 
Mauritania's PRSP is perhaps the only exception to that, as it states it intends to 
promote monetary easing to support economic growth. 
 
To maintain inflation low or to bring them to low levels, the Papers essentially 
propose the adoption of prudent monetary policy. However, they do not explain in 
detail through what mechanisms and rules a prudent policy might be adopted. A few 
Papers make reference to the adoption of money base targets and Central Bank 
autonomy. Box 1 summarises the proposed monetary policy for each of the 15 
countries. 
 
Box 1. Monetary Policy (and Objectives) 
 
 Measures proposed in the PRSPs 
Burkina Faso WAEMU member country 
Bolivia Not specified 
Ethiopia Monetary targeting based on monitoring reserve and broad money 
Honduras To maintain an effective monetary policy; prudent liquidity management through 
open-market operations, mainly by auctioning Monetary Absorption Certificates; 
policy consistent with interest rates favourable to investment and inflation no higher 
than one digit. 
Malawi Tight monetary policy and Central  Bank autonomy for avoiding financing pressure 
Mauritania Rigorous monetary policy  to support exchange rate policy and low inflation. 
Mozambique To  avoid monetisation of the fiscal deficit 
Nicaragua Inflation targeting: to reduce inflation rate to 4.0% by 2005. 
Niger WAEMU member country 
Rwanda Broad money  targeting 
Senegal WAEMU member country 
Tanzania Prudent monetary policy (not further specified) 
Uganda Monetary targeting: growth rate of M2 of 15%. 
Vietnam Prudent monetary policy; introduction of monetary and credit controls aimed at 
improving the effectiveness of policy monitoring and meeting the targeted objectives. 
Zambia To make open market operations more transparent and to grant the Central Bank 
greater legal and operational autonomy 
Sources: countries' PRSPs. 
 
                                                          
9 See Gottschalk (2003) for a discussion of high inflation and its implications for poverty and 
inequality, in the Latin American context. 
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The vagueness in the specification of the monetary policy may be explained mainly 
by the countries' lack of monetary instruments to control liquidity in an effective way. 
Moreover, the countries lack technical and monitoring capacity for implementing 
effectively a carefully designed monetary policy. In some cases, liquidity has been 
excessive at times even when prudent fiscal policy is being pursued, due to a boom in 
foreign investment and the release of resources by the HIPC initiative. This has posed 
a challenge for the monetary authorities, and in recognition to that, no specific targets 
have been stipulated.10  
 
Burkina Faso, Niger and Senegal are WAEMU member countries.11 They therefore 
differ from the other countries for sharing a common currency, the CFA Franc, and 
for not having their own monetary policy, as this was handed over to the Central Bank 
of West African States (BCEAO). 
 
In light of the above, it is possible to identify two main facts. First, almost all PRSP 
countries have already achieved price stability, but have not adapted their monetary 
policy to this new reality, by broadening its focus to encompass the growth and 
employment objectives. Moreover, it is important to note that in many countries 
inflation is already at very low levels; aiming for an even lower inflation may not be 
cost-effective. Second, the countries have suffered from lack of instruments for an 
effective monetary policy. In recognition of that, the PRSPs place a major emphasis 
on fiscal discipline to ensure macroeconomic stability. 
 
3.3 The Fiscal Framework 
 
The fiscal policy is presented in the PRSPs as key for ensuring macroeconomic 
stability. The Papers affirm that it should be prudent to ensure a balanced budget 
(after grants) or at least be sustainable over time. The commitment to prudent fiscal 
policy is a common feature underlying all Papers. Other common features in the 
countries’ fiscal frameworks include their commitment to generating higher public 
revenues through tax reform (discussed further below); rationalisation of public 
                                                          
10 Tanzania has been a case in point - see Gottschalk and Griffith-Jones (2002). 
11 WAEMU stands for West African Economic and Monetary Union. It comprises the following 
countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
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expenditure; and, above all, reallocation of public expenditure towards poverty-
reduction programmes. Indeed, at the budgetary level, the proposed frameworks have 
an important pro-poor bias. Moreover, they have been formulated with the increasing 
degree of participation of the civil society, which will certainly improve the 
transparency and effectiveness of implementation of programmes, particularly the 
social ones. 
 
 
Table 6. Overall Fiscal Surplus (Incl. Grant) as % GDP 
 Average 1990-94 Average 1995-99 2000 2001 
Bolivia -1.9 -2.3 -3.4 -6.8 
Burkina Faso -3.8 -3.0 -4.3 -4.3 
Ethiopia -7.8 -5.1 -11.4 -5.0 
Honduras Na Na Na Na 
Malawi -8.4 -5.0 -4.9 -7.3 
Mauritania -4.9 4.4 -1.6 -2.8 
Mozambique -4.2 -2.5 -4.5 -4.9 
Nicaragua -7.3 -1.11 Na Na 
Niger -5.2 -3.0 -2.0 -2.4 
Rwanda -7.6 -3.5 0.1 -1.1 
Senegal -1.6 0.9 0.3 -1.9 
Tanzania 1.8 -0.6 -1.2 -0.7 
Uganda -4.5 -1.5 -8.7 -3.0 
Vietnam -1.42 -0.8 -2.8 -2.9 
Zambia -5.6 -2.1 -5.0 -7.2 
Sources: World Bank Africa Database for African countries; and WDI 2003 for the others. 
1 1995-98. 2 Year 1994. 
 
Looking at Table 6, which displays figures of the overall fiscal performance of the 
countries under analysis, it is possible to notice that for a number of countries the 
budgetary situation worsened rather than improved around the time the PRSPs were 
being designed. This was the case after a decade during which nearly all countries had 
made clear strides towards small fiscal deficits. Also, by comparing Table 6 with 
Table 3, which displays information on growth performance, it is possible to observe 
that the fiscal trends had a counter-cyclical pattern in nearly all countries. That is, as 
growth accelerated from the first to the second half of the 1990s, their fiscal deficits 
declined, and when growth slowed down in 2000, the deficits increased again.  
 
This trend analysis should be seen with caution, as it is based on 5-year averages, 
therefore possibly hiding a different yearly pattern. Moreover, the averages are based 
on figures that vary significantly across different sources. However, if a counter-
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cyclical pattern in fiscal trends really exists, the PRSPs in their general commitment 
to budget balance do not seem to recognise either its past existence or its importance 
as a means of dealing with economic downturns. Yet, despite this, at a more detailed 
level of analysis some degree of variation can be found across the proposed 
frameworks. 
 
At one extreme, one can find Burkina Faso, Niger and Senegal. These are WAEMU 
member countries that have agreed to the WAEMU Convergence, Stability, Growth 
and Solidarity Pact. The key elements of the Pact include meeting the following 
convergence criteria: nominal fiscal balance, the ceiling of 35% for the ratio of the 
wage bill to total tax revenue, a debt to GDP ratio not higher than 70%, and annual 
inflation not higher than 3% (see Box 2 for more details on the Pact).  
 
These criteria are very stringent, especially for Niger. Consequently, these countries' 
room for action on fiscal matters is extremely limited, as their commitment to 
converging towards the WAEMU criteria takes away any flexibility for adapting their 
fiscal framework to their particular circumstances and needs. 
 
Box 2. WAEMU.s Convergence, Stability, Growth, and Solidarity Pact 
 
The WAEMU.s Convergence, Stability, Growth, and Solidarity Pact is a formal agreement adopted in 
1999 by a group of countries of the Franc of the African Financial Community (CFA), concretely 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. This agreement is 
aimed at strengthening monetary and fiscal convergence, reinforcing macroeconomic stability, 
accelerating economic growth and enhancing solidarity amongst member countries. The Pact entered 
into force in 2003. 
 
 The primary convergence criteria are: 
 
- Ratio of the basic fiscal balance to nominal GDP must be 0% or more. 
- Ratio of outstanding domestic and foreign debt to nominal GDP must not exceed 70%.   
- Average annual inflation rate cannot be more than 3% per year. 
- Non-accumulation of domestic and external payments arrears in the current financial period. 
 
The secondary criteria are as follows: 
 
- Ratio of the wage bill to tax revenue cannot exceed 35%. 
- Ratio of domestically financed public investment to tax revenue must be at least 20%. 
- Ratio of the current external deficit (excluding grants) to nominal GDP cannot exceed 5%.  
- Tax to GDP ratio must be 17% or more. 
 
There is a mechanism of sanctions specified in case of no compliance by WAEMU member countries. 
 
Vietnam's Paper stands at the other extreme of the spectrum for focusing on revenue 
increase rather than on expenditure cuts to achieve fiscal balance. As the Paper puts it, 
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their main objective is to 'improve the fiscal policy, implement reforms in the taxation 
system, and expand the tax base to ensure a healthy state budget balance' (Vietnam's 
PRSP, 2000). It moreover stands apart from the other Papers for introducing the 
higher number of progressive elements in its proposed fiscal framework. These 
include their reference to the adoption of instruments to mobilise capital, including 
the use of preferential taxes targeted at new investment and production expansion, the 
acknowledgment of the need to ensure a balance between capital expenditure and 
recurrent expenditure and, in the area of tax reforms, the expectation that the proposed 
reform of the tax system should result in an increase in the share of revenues from 
direct (rather than indirect) taxes in total revenues. 
 
The latter point is a particularly important one, as nearly all other countries that intend 
to undertake tax reforms emphasise the need for widening the tax base, mainly 
through the strengthening of the VAT, while promising to alleviate the corporate 
sector from a heavy tax burden. Clearly the objective of widening the tax base is an 
important one for countries where the tax collection system is weak and the level of 
tax revenues low. But it is also important to bear in mind that some of the proposed 
mechanisms to achieve higher tax revenue collection are clearly regressive, and even 
more so in countries where poverty is so deep and widespread. Unfortunately, this 
fact is not acknowledged in the PRSPs. 
 
As regards the remaining PRSPs, a few interesting elements can also be found in their 
proposed fiscal frameworks. That is, it is possible to identify a number of specific 
measures and mechanisms some of which innovative, aimed among other things at 
supporting growth and the most vulnerable. These can be summarised as follows. 
 
First, whilst supporting fiscal balance on principle, a few countries' fiscal frameworks 
foresee the increase in the fiscal deficits, a development seen as necessary in the short 
term to deal with terms of trade shocks and other unexpected events. Uganda and 
Zambia are two cases in point. Second, Mauritania proposes an easing in its budgetary 
policy to finance investment to support economic growth; in addition, it states clearly 
that additional expenditure is PRSP related, thereby making it clear that these are 
planned ex-ante and justified from a poverty reduction strategy perspective. And 
third, Rwanda proposes an increase in public expenditure in social infrastructure and 
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services to avoid their erosion or even collapse, therefore ensuring long-term 
sustainability. Also, it envisages the possibility of an increase in capital expenditure 
above long-term levels, if additional funds are made available. Furthermore, it 
proposes the creation of new financial mechanisms to smooth out expenditures in 
times of revenue fluctuations. 
 
All these proposed initiatives show the countries cited above introduced a few 
elements in their fiscal frameworks that allow for some flexibility. Because increased 
deficits are predicted, intended to have either a counter-cyclical role (as in the cases of 
Uganda and Zambia), or a link to long-term sustainability of basic services (as in the 
case of Rwanda) or of the growth process more broadly (as in the case of Mauritania), 
they do not undermine, but rather reinforce, the credibility of their fiscal regimes. 
 
Increased flexibility in fiscal policy is important to enable countries to deal with 
volatility either associated with the business cycle or caused by exogenous shocks, so 
that its negative effects on growth and poverty can be reduced. As regards the effects 
on the latter, case studies conducted by the IMF on Cambodia, Honduras, Zimbabwe, 
Mali and Uganda show that in nearly all cases poverty increased in these countries 
following exogenous shocks (IMF, 2003, p. 10, Box 1). Moreover, according to 
Ferranti et al. (2000, cited by Fiess, 2002), social expenditures, and in particular 
targeted expenditure, tend to fall during the downswing of the business cycle. 
 
A further reason for dealing with economic volatility is that both their growth and 
poverty impacts are asymmetric - that is, the negative effects are larger than the 
positive ones following recovery.12  
 
Other interesting initiatives in the fiscal frameworks concern new modalities and 
sources of funding, and safety nets. As regards sources of funding, Honduras suggests 
the creation of a poverty reduction fund, with resources coming from debt relief and 
privatisation. And Senegal proposes the use of alternative sources of finance like 
regional markets for public debt bonds. As regards safety nets, a few countries 
propose the inclusion in their fiscal frameworks of safety nets to deal with shocks and 
                                                          
12 See Collier and Dehn (2001) for evidence on the first form of asymmetry, and the IMF (2003) on the 
latter. 
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their effects, and other mechanisms to deal with unexpected events. For example, 
Mozambique proposes programmes to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters; and 
Tanzania, the provision of safety nets and the undertaking of special initiatives to 
prevent the collapse of crop production. 
 
Finally, Uganda proposes the creation of an equalisation grant, to tackle gender and 
other inequalities; Box 2 summarises the countries' main fiscal features and their 
innovative elements. 
 
 
Box 2. Fiscal Policy: Main Elements (and Objectives) 
 
 Measures proposed in the PRSPs 
Burkina Faso Prudent budgetary policy; commitment to the WAEMU convergence criteria. 
Bolivia Sustainable fiscal deficits based on non-inflationary sources of finance; deficit 
expected to continue in the short- to medium term due to the cost of structural reforms 
such as pension reform; therefore need to finance priority social programmes with 
other resources, to be generated domestically (tax collection from VAT and import 
consumption tax) and to come from foreign sources like the HIPC initiative.  
Ethiopia Fiscal discipline based on reducing the fiscal deficit to sustainable levels and 
reorienting expenditure, especially towards agriculture, health and education; increase 
in tax revenue from 14.3% to 17.7% of GDP through tax reform; moving forward 
towards fiscal federalism. Acknowledgement that macroeconomic discipline is 
dependent on structural factors and external shocks. 
Honduras Low fiscal deficit through firm control over fiscal expenditures; fiscal revenue 
strengthening through enlarging sales tax, improving the customs valuation system, 
and modifying the Income Tax Law; efforts to improve tax administration; 
rationalisation of public expenditure should give priority to poverty-reduction 
programmes; creation of a poverty reduction fund (with resources coming from debt 
relief and privatisation). 
Malawi Prudent fiscal policy; reduction of fiscal deficit aimed at reducing interest rates and 
crowding out, so that incentives are provided and resources made available for private 
investment; improving public expenditure policy management and parastatals' 
expenditure; more autonomy to treasury and budget to avoid pressure for financing 
the budget. 
Mauritania Sound budgetary policy in the long term; in the short- to medium term, controlled 
easing of budgetary policy with a view to supporting economic growth; projected 
medium-term budget deficit with an upward trend (from 1.5% in 2000 to 3% in 2004) 
as a reflection of increased public investment and other additional expenditure related 
to PRSP projects; increase in tax revenue through new tax reform (incl. VAT 
management improvement); prioritisation in the allocation of public expenditure. 
Mozambique Limiting budgetary expenditure; increase in fiscal revenue from 15% to 17% through 
income growth and tax reform; mobilising budgetary resources; dynamic approach to 
resource allocation, by acknowledging rapid growth is the best way of creating 
resources for essential public services; greater co-ordination and transparency of 
public expenditure; rationalisation of tax services and costumes; ensuring flow of 
international finance; adoption of programmes to reduce vulnerability to natural 
disasters. 
Nicaragua Rationalisation of public investment programmes (based on a bottom-up approach); 
increase in government spending on poverty-related outlays to 62% of the budget. 
Niger Strict budgetary policy; commitment to the WAEMU convergence criteria.  
Rwanda Programme for reduction, prioritisation and rationalisation of expenditure; tax reform, 
 25
aimed at reducing corporate tax, increasing VAT and introducing new taxes; short-run 
increase in capital expenditure above long-term level, if funds are made available; 
temporary increases in public expenditure required in the short run to ensure long-
term sustainability; the development of a range of financial instruments so that 
expenditure can be smoothed out during periods of revenue fluctuations. 
Senegal Commitment to the convergence criteria of the WAEMU; simplification of taxation 
and broadening of the tax base; public expenditure closely monitored in order to 
obtain a positive budget balance; use of alternative sources of finance like the regional 
market for public debt bonds. 
Tanzania Prudent fiscal policy; improvement of expenditure planning; expected increase in 
revenue and expenditure due to tax reform; rationalisation of the tax system; 
provision of additional safety nets and the undertaking of special initiatives to prevent 
the collapse of crop production. 
Uganda Prioritisation of expenditure towards the poor; overall fiscal deficit expected to 
increase in 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 to 8.1% and 9.7%, and to decline later to 8.2% 
in 2002/2003; equalisation grants. 
Vietnam Appropriate fiscal policy to safeguard medium-term sustainability; strengthening of 
the tax system; increase in the tax base through new sources of tax revenue and the 
efficiency of the tax payment system (while ensuring it remains pro-poor); increase in 
expenditures on basic social services and rural infrastructure; public expenditure bias 
in favour of poor provinces; increase in the budget transparency so as to improve the 
information base for decision-making and target setting; balance between capital 
investment and recurrent expenditure; adoption of preferential taxes for new 
investment and production expansion, technology innovation, new product 
development, etc. 
Zambia Balanced budget in 2003 and 2004; but increase in the budget deficit in the short run; 
need for policies to target the losers resulting from the adjustments caused by the 
growth process.  
Sources: countries' PRSPs. 
 
The elements just described are important because they can have a counter-cyclical 
role, for example in helping attenuate an economic downturn. Unfortunately, these 
elements are too few and not sufficiently widespread across the various proposed 
fiscal frameworks. This is a reason for concern, because the fiscal policy should be 
seen as a key one, not just for supporting stability, but also growth and poverty 
reduction.  
 
It should be recognised that the room for adopting these elements may be extremely 
limited. As seen in Table 6, although a few countries are close to a balanced fiscal 
position, a number of them are not. To the latter group of countries, pursuing a 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy would mean distancing themselves even further from 
their commitment to fiscal balance. A more fundamental problem is that, given the 
level of their public debt (still extremely high despite the enhanced-HIPC), pursuing 
large fiscal deficits may not be sustainable.   
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A further issue in relation to the proposed frameworks concerns lack of sufficient 
acknowledgement of potential conflicts. A key one, likely to arise in all cases, is the 
conflict between the need for budgetary balance and the numerous demands 
associated with a development strategy that aims to support growth and combat 
poverty. Conflicts may also arise between different areas of the budget. For example, 
the resource conflict between capital expenditure, required for growth, and recurrent 
expenditure, to support social programmes. Acknowledging this conflict is important 
given the gap between the resources needed to meet the very ambitious targets (both 
in terms of growth and social expenditures) set in the Papers, and the resources 
available in reality, which are very limited. Unfortunately, the failure to sufficiently 
acknowledge these conflicts, or to discuss the potential trade-offs can create 
expectations that may not be fulfilled.  
 
3.4. The Exchange Rate Policy 
 
The majority of the PRSPs explicitly identify the exchange rate policy as key to 
support their objectives of growth and poverty reduction. In this regard, they intend to 
adopt a competitive exchange rate, so as to improve the country's overall level of 
competitiveness and the export sector in particular. Prioritising the export sector 
implies in most cases benefiting the rural sector, where the export activities are 
concentrated. 
 
A competitive exchange rate also provides some degree of effective protection to the 
countries' import-competing industries. This is particularly important in a context in 
which trade barriers may be reduced, as a result of trade liberalisation programmes.   
 
Counter-acting the effects of a reduction in trade barriers is important, because, 
contrary to what one might think, many PRSP countries do have import-competing 
activities of sizeable importance, both in rural and urban areas, which are labour 
intensive. These activities may not just suffer from external competition, but 
disappear altogether if the levels of protection fall too rapidly and intensively. The 
poverty impact can be enormous, given the lack of social insurance and of 
employment alternatives in urban areas. Migration to the rural sector that may result 
would at least in the short term seriously compound poverty problems in the sector, 
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given its inability to absorb additional labour productively in an already saturated 
labour market, which tends to be the case in most countries. The ultimate outcome 
would be a sharp increase in extreme poverty, as the newly unemployed, both urban 
and rural, would end up engaging themselves in the most primitive forms of 
subsistence.  
 
Of course, a competitive exchange rate would affect negatively urban consumers, 
those rural consumers that are wage earners, and capital-importing activities. There 
are, therefore, important dilemmas around the exchange rate policy. But there are no 
general prescriptions in this case. The dilemmas facing policy makers should be 
addressed with policy actions tailored to the specific structural characteristics and 
circumstances of each country concerned.  
 
To ensure enhanced competitiveness, many PRSPs suggest that a flexible exchange 
rate may be the most appropriate regime to adopt. A flexible exchange rate regime 
seems in fact appropriate, not only to ensure competitiveness, but also to serve as a 
hedging mechanism against terms of trade and other external shocks.  
 
A few countries like the WAEMU ones, however, are committed to a fixed exchange 
rate instead (see Box 3 for a summary of the proposed exchange rate regimes). They 
therefore do not have the ability to use the exchange rate as an instrument to support 
their export sectors, or as a defence mechanism against terms of trade shocks. 
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Box 3. The Exchange Rate  
 Exchange rate policy/regimes proposed in the PRSPs 
Burkina Faso Fixed (WAEMU member country) 
Bolivia Crawling peg (aimed at ensuring a competitive exchange rate). 
Ethiopia Stable exchange rate 
Honduras Competitive exchange rate and the avoidance of exchange rate appreciation. 
Malawi Not specified. 
Mauritania Not specified. 
Mozambique Maintaining a competitive exchange rate. 
Nicaragua Not specified. 
Niger Fixed exchange rate regime (WAEMU member country). 
Rwanda Policy based on intervention in the exchange rate to smooth short-term fluctuations 
while allowing it to adjust to export price movements. 
Senegal Fixed regime (WAEMU member country). 
Tanzania Not specified. 
Uganda Market determined with intervention to avoid excessive volatility and to maintain net 
international reserves. 
Vietnam Increased flexibility and transparency of the foreign exchange regime. 
Zambia Not specified. 
Sources: countries' PRSPs. 
 
Of course, the choice of a flexible exchange rate is not problem-free either, although 
clearly it seems far more appropriate than a fixed one. In countries subject to frequent 
terms of trade shocks, a fully flexible exchange rate regime may imply excessive 
exchange rate variability, which could hurt long-term growth through uncertainty it 
creates among exporters, affecting in particular those that are risk averse. In the PRSP 
countries, risk-averse exporters tend to be the majority, given their lack of access to 
hedging instruments, which could be used against exchange rate risk. A further issue 
concerns the problem of possible excessive currency depreciation. This could cause 
inflationary pressures and major shifts in the currency asset-liability balances of the 
financial and other sectors of the economy. Those countries experiencing a high 
degree of dollarisation, such as Bolivia and Uganda, may be particularly vulnerable to 
excessive currency depreciation, as Argentina's recent crisis demonstrates.  
 
An additional problem countries may face is not that of excessive currency 
depreciation, but of appreciation. A few PRSP countries are experiencing this 
problem, due to a combination of export earnings, FDI and HIPC-released resources 
(e.g. Tanzania). Their response has been to intervene in the foreign exchange market, 
which has implied the accumulation of international reserves. The latter can be seen 
as a positive development in itself, to the extent it can serve as an important cushion 
to be used in times of difficulties. However, it may also imply excessive liquidity 
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expansion. The response to liquidity expansion may take the form of sterilisation 
operations, but this can be fiscally costly and difficult for the monetary authorities to 
manage in light of the limited number of monetary/financial instruments at their 
disposal.  
 
As can be seen in Box 3, a number of PRSPs recognise some of the potential 
problems linked to a flexible exchange rate regime. They therefore propose a 
pragmatic approach, based on casual interventions in the foreign exchange markets to 
avoid excessive exchange rate variability; in addition, some of the proposed regimes 
are intended to ensure a reasonable level of international reserves. 
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4. The Financial Reforms 
 
Practically all PRSPs strongly emphasise their commitment to undertaking financial 
reforms, seen as necessary for the development of the financial sector and growth 
enhancement. These reforms include strengthening the banking system via more 
competition (and its increased internationalisation, though this latter aspect is not 
made explicit in the PRSPs), and improving prudential banking regulation and 
supervision, in line with the Basle core principles. Box 4 summarises the main 
reforms proposed by each PRSP, as well as their specific aims. 
 
Box 4. Financial Reform  
 Specific Measures and Aims 
Burkina Faso Not specified. 
Bolivia Not specified. 
Ethiopia Increase banking competition and improve banking system. 
Honduras Ensure strict implementation of prudential regulations in accordance with 
international standards, and take quick action to liquidate financial institutions when 
necessary; reform legal procedures that affect financial transactions, in order to 
facilitate financial intermediation in favour of the productive sectors; promote the 
merger of small financial institutions; implement the governing laws: Stock Markets, 
Insurance and Re-Insurance Institutions, and Deposit Insurance; and achieve prompt 
approval of the law to regulate pension funds. 
Malawi Not specified. 
Mauritania Creation of a viable and solid financial system; development of a financial sector 
strategy, allowing for the entry of new banks and increasing competition. 
Mozambique Minimise the risk of crises; promote the development of the financial services and 
micro-credit, and create conditions for a reduction in domestic interest rates; 
strengthening supervision according to the Basle principles. 
Nicaragua Strengthening the financial system, including the implementation of prudential norms 
of capital adequacy, credit risk assessment, provisioning, and on-lending limits to 
related parties; plan to strengthen superintendency of banks and the supervision 
process.  
Niger Increase financial deepening. 
Rwanda Financial sector reform based on restructuring and auditing of existing banks; 
strengthening regulation and supervision by the Central Bank. 
Senegal Improve surveillance and prudential regulation of the banking system. 
Tanzania Strengthening of the banking system. 
Uganda Reforms in the banking and financial system. 
Vietnam Reform the banking sector and financial organisations to mobilise domestic capital; 
build a system and measures to control the volatility of foreign capital flows, 
especially of short-term flows. 
Zambia Measures for improving regulation, supervision and adoption of international 
standards. 
Sources: countries' PRSPs. 
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These measures are very important to ensure the stability of the financial system, 
especially in view of its vulnerability to the volatility of key macroeconomic 
variables, particularly the exchange rate.  
 
Very few PRSPs make reference, however, to the link between the liberalisation of 
the external account and the stability of the domestic financial system. This is an 
important aspect to highlight, because some of the countries under analysis, e.g. 
Bolivia, Uganda, Zambia, have promoted full capital account convertibility, while a 
few others have liberalised their capital accounts considerably, though not entirely. 
Thus, these countries have increased their vulnerability to private capital flows; of 
course, it is true that they may not face the problem of excessive private capital 
inflows and their reversal, like so many emerging economies do. But they may face 
the opposite problem of capital outflows, mainly by residents. Although many 
residents can take their capital out of the country through illegal channels, the big 
holders of capital - institutional investors among a few others - cannot. It is important, 
therefore, that countries that have not liberalised their capital account yet, wait for a 
very long time to do so; as regards those that have already, it is important that they 
adopt measures to reduce the vulnerability of their banking systems to the opening of 
their capital accounts. 
 
A more fundamental problem in relation to the proposed financial reforms, is that, 
aimed at ensuring the stability of the financial system, they are not designed to 
support growth, and even less pro-poor growth. For example, due to the need to meet 
capital adequacy levels, selective credit policies in support of specific groups or 
sectors which otherwise would not have access to credit, may end up being drastically 
reduced or even totally eliminated. This is already happening in countries that have 
started implementing these reforms. 
 
Tanzania is a case in point. There, international banks, which are increasingly 
dominating the domestic markets, tend to adopt cherry-picking strategies, which mean 
lending to foreign companies and big domestic companies. Domestic banks are the 
ones that still lend to small - and medium-size domestic companies, but to the extent 
that they have to comply with strict capital requirements, they will reduce lending to 
SMEs (Gottschalk and Griffith-Jones, 2002). Moreover, as these banks are 
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encouraged to adopt more sophisticated risk assessment systems, they may face 
constraints to lend to poor customers, as these customers are unlikely to be able to 
provide the information banks need to feed their new assessment systems. 
Furthermore, in response to pressures to gain efficiency, these banks have been 
closing their agencies in areas of lower population density, which tend to be the rural 
ones where the poor are concentrated. The overall trend would be therefore of less, 
rather than more, credit to the poor - and the SMEs, which are important employment-
generating sources. 
 
Unfortunately, this potential conflict is being overlooked by the PRSPs, but should be 
addressed, as credit to the poor is recognised by the Papers to have a strategic role in 
poverty reduction, as it can directly affect the earning capacity of the poor. 
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5. Policy Recommendations 
 
The purpose of this section is to suggest a set of policy recommendations on how 
macroeconomic policies can be improved so as to support more rapid and stable 
growth, and poverty reduction. Recommendations will be made for each of the 
macroeconomic policies discussed above, in addition to the financial reform: 
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies. 
 
1) Monetary policy 
 
Price stability is very important to long-term growth, and therefore should be a main 
objective of monetary policy. However, once price stability is achieved, supporting 
growth and employment should also be included among the objectives of monetary 
policy, as indeed they are in the US and other developed countries.  
 
How could that be done? Admittedly, PRSP countries have few monetary instruments 
that permit them to pursue an effective monetary policy to address multiple 
objectives, which sometimes are difficult to accommodate. This requires some room 
for manoeuvre.   
 
In this regard, it seems important that inflation targeting, if adopted, does not have an 
excessively low target, nor too a narrow band, for inflation.  Also, too a low inflation 
target may not be appropriate for these countries as they may be subject to higher 
price variability when compared to developed countries, given the price shocks they 
are subject to, and their relatively weaker production and distribution systems. 
 
To support growth directly, a few ideas already proposed in some PRSPs, such as a 
regional public bond market, could be taken forward. For example, WAEMU member 
countries could create a common bond market without facing major institutional or 
economic barriers. The fact these countries have a Monetary Union and a common 
Central Bank would greatly facilitate the creation of such a market. Of course, other 
sub-regions, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), where 
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steps towards regional capital market liberalisation are being taken, could also 
consider the creation of a common market for public bonds at the sub-regional level. 
 
2) Fiscal policy 
 
PRSP countries are correct in pursuing a prudent fiscal policy. This policy stance 
gives it credibility thereby contributing to macroeconomic stability and long-term 
growth. However, prudence should be based on realistic fiscal targets, and should not 
preclude flexibility. As regards the latter, it should mean allowing for counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy. Chile, for example, has adopted a counter-cyclical element in its fiscal 
policy framework. In this framework, a structural fiscal surplus of 1% should be met. 
The structural fiscal balance is the difference between the actual fiscal balance and the 
cyclical component of the balance. Having a structural fiscal target rather than actual 
target implies that the government will be able to increase public expenditure during 
the downswing phase of the business cycle, and decrease it during the upswing phase 
(Fiess, 2002). This mechanism gives the government room for fiscal policy that can 
be used to stimulate demand and counter-act the negative poverty effects associated 
with economic recession. This is a rules-based policy, which therefore does not 
undermine government credibility (ECLAC, 2002). 
 
Flexibility in the fiscal framework should be allowed for, not only to deal with the 
downturn of the business cycle, but also to deal with the effects of external shocks. 
PRSP countries are particularly affected by the latter, due to their narrow economic 
structures and heavy reliance of a few primary commodities as sources of fiscal 
revenues. A very appropriate initiative for countries with these characteristics is the 
creation of funds as Chile's Cooper Compensation Fund, Colombia’s Oil Stabilisation 
Fund and, among the PRSP countries, Burkina Faso’s Cotton Support Fund.13 These 
funds, which are not sufficiently discussed in the PRSPs, could be incorporated into 
the countries’ fiscal frameworks. Of course, these countries should attempt to 
diversify their economic structure and export base, but this will only be achieved in 
the long term. In the meantime, alternative measures should be considered. 
 
                                                          
13 For a reference to Burkina Faso’s Cotton Support Fund, and the role it played in 2001-2002, when 
cotton prices fell sharply, see IMF (2002). 
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To cope with exogenous shocks and their consequences, countries should in addition 
follow Mozambique and Tanzania in having safety nets, as well as programmes to 
reduce vulnerability to natural disasters and to prevent the collapse of crop 
production. 
 
Specifically as regards the WAEMU member countries, which are committed to the 
convergence criteria of their Stability and Growth Pact, it is important that more room 
be created for counter-cyclical policies. Also, it is important provisions are made for 
their main sources of volatility, such as fluctuations in their main commodity prices. 
Of course, provisions linked to commodity price fluctuations can be equally adopted 
by those countries not committed to a stability pact, but that still have self-imposed 
fiscal targets. It should be noted that flexibility in fiscal policy makes it even more 
credible. 
 
To increase room for counter-cyclical fiscal policy, it seems crucial that the PRSP 
countries' public debts are further reduced through a re-enhanced HIPC. Alternatively, 
the international community should contribute to a substantial increase in aid flows, 
through innovative mechanisms such as the International Finance Facility (IFF), as 
proposed by the UK Treasury. The latter proposes to double the current level of aid 
flows to poor countries until 2015.14 It should be noted that this initiative would be 
important not just as a means of increasing aid flows, but of providing a stable stream 
of finance. The stability in aid flows would permit them to have a clearer counter-
cyclical role, thereby helping reduce macroeconomic instability. 
 
Finally, it is important that the potential conflict among the numerous demands for 
public expenditure be appropriately addressed. It would particularly desirable that 
minimum thresholds be established for certain types public expenditure, such as 
health and education, but particularly capital expenditure, which in times of recession 
or crisis tends to be disproportionately reduced. A special fund could be created with 
the proceeds of privatisation, thus similar to the poverty fund proposed by the 
Honduras PRSP, to be activated when the minimum thresholds are hit. 
                                                          
14 For technical details of the proposal, see HM Treasury and DFID (2003). 
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3) Exchange rate policy 
 
A flexible exchange rate regime should be preferable to a fixed one, as it maximises 
the degree of freedom of macroeconomic policy and contributes to the strengthening 
of the country's external sector. Nevertheless, countries should be careful with 
excessive volatility of the exchange rate, as this volatility may have a negative impact 
on foreign trade, domestic prices and the balance-sheets of banks and non-financial 
companies. They should therefore be prepared to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market to avoid excessive volatility, and for that purpose, be able to accumulate a 
sizeable amount of international reserves. 
 
4) Financial sector reform 
 
Efforts to develop the financial system and ensure it is stable through prudential 
supervision and regulation are essential, as crises in the domestic financial system are 
extremely costly and disruptive, both in economic and social terms. However, it is 
also important to find a balance between ensuring the stability of the financial system, 
and development finance. As regards the latter, thought should be put on new and 
creative institutional mechanisms to support credit to the poor and to job-generating 
activities. Both public and private mechanisms (such as public guarantees) should be 
considered for that purpose. Unfortunately, among the PRSPs under analysis, the 
evidence is that few identify how new financing mechanisms in support of the poor 
can be provided.  Bolivia’s PRSP is among the few ones that in acknowledging the 
role of micro-finance can play in reducing poverty, identifies what institutions and 
mechanisms should be promoted or created in order to ensure the poor have access to 
finance. Other PRSPs should do the same, as this effort helps make certain trade-offs 
explicit and therefore less difficult to overcome. 
 
Finally, still in regard to the stability of the financial system, some PRSP countries 
have already largely liberalised their capital accounts. They thus may be vulnerable to 
the volatility of capital flows, and therefore should adopt measures to reduce this 
volatility, or at least to deal with their effects. The latter tend to affect in particular the 
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stability of the financial system, due to the sudden changes they cause in the banks' 
balance sheets, mainly through their impact on the exchange rate. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
It is important to recognise that the PRSPs have had very positive aspects. These 
include the participation of the civil society in the design, implementation and 
monitoring processes; transparency; and appreciable progress in budgetary planning 
and social policies. Moreover, the PRSPs have provided a unique opportunity for poor 
countries to have an integrated, national development strategy, something that had 
been missing since the late 1970s and early 1980s, when these countries embarked on 
market-oriented reforms. 
 
There is a strong agreement among the PRSPs that broad-based growth should be at 
the centre of a development strategy. Taking that as a starting point, this paper 
focused on possible links between the PRSP’s proposed macroeconomic policies and 
the PRSP’s claimed objective of achieving pro-poor growth. Throughout, the 
evidence found was that the macroeconomic frameworks as currently designed do not 
really support in a direct, clear way, economic growth and poverty reduction.  
 
The paper initially shows that most PRSPs have set quite ambitious growth and 
poverty reduction targets, but that the sources of growth and/or resources required to 
meet these targets are not always clearly identified. Moreover, the macroeconomic 
policies that could support growth are specified in ways to support mainly 
macroeconomic stability. The underlying assumption being that, provided a stable 
macroeconomic environment is in place, enhanced growth will ensue automatically, 
and ignoring the fact that in the past the same policies have not been enough to 
guarantee growth and poverty reduction.  
 
The paper further shows that the macroeconomic frameworks proposed by the PRSPs 
have very few embedded mechanisms that can be activated to counteract the effects of 
macroeconomic volatility, and in particular to deal with major exogenous shocks, 
which tend to affect most strongly the poorest. This represents a serious problem, as 
virtually all countries adopting PRSPs face a situation of extreme vulnerability to 
shocks such as terms of trade and natural disasters. 
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The lack of elements in the macroeconomic frameworks that can support growth and 
reduce macroeconomic volatility should be seen with concern. Nowadays both 
developed and middle-income countries are searching for alternative macroeconomic 
policies, so as to appropriately address the problems they are facing in an increasingly 
integrated and unstable world economy. At the same time, the poorer countries are 
being encouraged to stick with the sort of policies that may have been useful in the 
past to bring about macroeconomic stability and balance of payments equilibrium, but 
that nonetheless have failed to support growth and reduce poverty.  
 
Structural policies have a vital role in supporting long-term growth. Likewise, 
macroeconomic policies should support growth in the long term through ensuring 
stability. However, in the new context in which macroeconomic stability has been 
assured, the priorities have changed from stability to growth and poverty reduction, 
and it is important that the PRSPs adapt their policies to these new priorities. That is, 
macroeconomic policies should support growth in the short term as well, and ensure it 
becomes less volatile.  
 
Today, the PRSPs carry with them a high degree of optimism. It would very 
frustrating if, as with the structural adjustment policies in the past, they failed to 
deliver what is being promised. This could cause a tremendous loss of credibility in 
the whole process, thereby making it even harder to meet the millennium 
development goals. 
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